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1. Introduction 
 
One of the main functions of the financial system in general, and the banking 
system in particular, is to favor economic growth through efficient intermediation 
between the savings of depositors and the investment of those demanding finance. 
Given that the exercise of market power translates into high margins that act as a 
disincentive to both savings and investment, the banking sector must be both efficient 
and competitive.  
 
This desirable situation of efficiency and competition does not correspond to the 
situation existing in many banking sectors, and particularly in the Mexican banking 
system. In relation to international standards, Mexico has high interest margins 
reflecting high intermediation costs, which in turn have a negative effect on the growth 
of savings, investment, employment and, consequently, the economic growth of the 
country.  In this context, it is of great interest to analyze the determinants of the net 
interest margin, dedicating special attention to the importance of competition in banking 
markets. 
 
The literature on banking has developed various models over the years 
explaining the behavior of the intermediation margin, and showing the importance of 
factors such as the degree of competition, credit risk, market risk, average operating 
costs, etc. In particular, the seminal study by Ho and Saunders (1981) models a bank as 
an intermediary between lenders and borrowers, and shows that the optimal pure spread 
depends on four factors: the degree of risk aversion, the market structure (proxy for 
competition), the average size of bank transactions, and the variance of the interest rate 
on loans and deposits (market risk). 
 
Subsequently, the theoretical model by Ho and Saunders (1981) has been 
expanded by other authors: Allen (1988) considers various types of loans with 
interdependent demands; Angbazo (1997) incorporates credit risk and interest rate risk, 
as well as the interaction between these two types of risk; Maudos and Fernández de 
Guevara (2004) include average operating costs as a determinant of the intermediation 
margin and use the Lerner index of market power as a direct measurement of the degree 
of competition; Carbó and Rodríguez (2007) extend the model by incorporating the 
importance of “non-traditional” activities, proposing a multi-output model with the aim 
of analyzing the relationship between bank margins and specialization.The model by Ho 
and Saunders (1981) has also been estimated empirically for the U.S. banking system 
and for six European countries by Saunders and Schumacher (2000); the European 
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banking system has also been analyzed by Lepetit et al. (2008); and Latin American 
banking by Brock and Rojas (2000), Martínez and Mody (2004), and Gelos (2006).  
 
In this context, the model of the determinants of the intermediation margin has 
not been estimated for the specific case of the Mexican banking system, and constitutes 
an interesting sector of analysis given that it has undergone continual structural changes 
in recent years1: liberalization of the sector through deregulation of interest rates, the 
abolition of coefficients of selective assignation of credit, and the elimination of the 
system of legal coefficients (1988-89). Subsequently, between 1991 and 1992, the 
banks were re-privatized after being nationalized in 1982 and a gradual opening-up of 
this sector to foreign investment began with the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). There was also a sharp increase in private credit without effective risk 
control, thus causing deterioration in banking assets. The conditions of this sector 
worsened with the financial and exchange rate collapse of 1994-95, which forced the 
Government to implement measures aimed at combating the high insolvency of the 
banks. Among them was the acceleration of the process of gradual opening-up to 
foreign investment (to inject capital) which, following the mergers and acquisitions that 
took place, led to the consolidation of this industry.  
 
There are several reasons which can explain the relevance and “uniqueness” of 
the Mexican case: a) it is a banking system which, over the period analyzed, has been 
subject to important structural changes. The events described above were accompanied 
by substantial changes in the banking regulation; b) the income structure of the Mexican 
banking system has changed as the non-interest income has become more important; c) 
the majority of the papers have analyzed empirically the determinants of interest 
margins in developed countries, whereas the Mexican case is characterized by a low 
level of bancarization (measured by bank’s assets to GDP); 4) the evolution of the net 
interest margin and the macroeconomic (and financial) conditions have been quite 
unstable during the last two decades, making Mexico a good laboratory in which to 
analyze the relationships between these two variables; and 5) given that the interest 
margin still remains at a high level, it is essential to analyze what causes this. Among 
the reasons usually given is the low level of competition, where there is evidence that 
monopolistic practices exist in some important markets (Avalos and Hernández-Trillo, 
2006). It is therefore of great interest to explore how competition affects the evolution 
of banking margins. The model estimated serves to explain and quantify the importance 
of these (income structure, macroeconomic conditions, etc.), and other variables on the 
evolution of the interest net interest margin in Mexico. Given the importance of 
                                                 
1 See Hernández (2007). 
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analyzing how the measures implemented have affected the evolution of Mexican 
banks’ margins, the objectives and novelties of the paper are as follows. First, it models 
theoretically the determinants of the intermediation margin, incorporating both the 
seminal study by Ho and Saunders (1981) and subsequent individual contributions, 
which include both average operating costs and non-traditional activities as 
determinants of the intermediation margin (Allen, 1988; Angbazo, 1997; Maudos and 
Fernández de Guevara, 2004; Carbó and Rodríguez, 2007). Second,  our study estimates 
for the first time the determinants of Mexican banks’ net interest income and their 
economic impact over the period 1993-2005, a period of deregulation, liberalization and 
consolidation of the sector. Third, in line with the assumptions of Carbó and Rodríguez 
(2007) that banks need to match the random deposit supply function and the random 
demand for lending and non-traditional activities across periods, we estimate a dynamic 
model in order to capture the inertia in the evolution of banking margins. Finally, we 
analyze whether the growing importance of non-financial activities2 has caused a 
reduction of the net interest margin, as has occurred in developed countries. 
 
The results obtained indicate that the greatest economic impact on the net 
interest margin is determined by operating costs and market power. The results also 
show that, in general, the expected signs are obtained in the coefficients of the variables 
considered in the literature explaining the intermediation margin. Thus, we find a 
positive relationship between the intermediation margin in the Mexican banking system 
and variables proxying market power (Lerner index), operating cost, volatility of market 
interest rates, implicit interest payment; and a negative relationship with the quality of 
management and non-interest income. This last negative effect may reflect a strategy of 
cross-subsidization with traditional activities in line with the findings of Carbó and 
Rodríguez (2007) and Lepetit et al. (2008). In other words, since banks engage in 
different non-lending activities, these other activities may influence the pricing of loan 
products due to cross-subsidization of bank products. However, its economic impact is 
insignificant. 
 
The model estimated serves to explain the evolution of net interest income in 
Mexico. The decreasing trend of the margin up to 1996 is compatible with the increase 
of credit risk and the volatility of market interest rates given that the effect of these 
variables is counteracted by the fall in market power and in operating costs. 
Subsequently, the margin presents an increasing trend until 1999 as a consequence of 
the increase in the Lerner index and in operating costs. The margin decreases from 2000 
to 2003. This effect is explained by the fall in 2000 and 2001 (2002 and 2003) of 
                                                 
2 Specifically, net banking commissions represented 0.5% in 1993 of total assets, increasing to 1.1% in 
1995, to 1.5% in 2001 and to 2.0% in 2005. 
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average operating cost (market power), credit risk, and implicit interest payments which 
counteract the increase in market power (average operating costs). Finally, in the last 
two years of the period analyzed, market power increased which caused a rise in the 
intermediation margin. 
 
From a financial stability perspective, the reasons behind the margin evolution in 
Mexico predominantly emanate from the micro level. Therefore, one of the main 
implications of economic policy deriving from the results obtained is the need to 
implement measures which are aimed at increasing competition and efficiency in the 
Mexican banking system, given the high economic impact of market power and of the 
average margin costs. In the first case, the evidence contributed by other works (Avalos 
and Hernández-Trillo, 2006; Solis and Maudos, 2008) shows that monopolistic 
practices exist in some important markets. Thus, it is necessary to prioritize measures 
aimed at increasing competition (such as decreasing the legal barriers to some products 
and fostering coordination between anti-trust authorities and regulators). In the second 
case, it is important that the Mexican banking system increases its levels of efficiency in 
costs, which will lower margins and benefit consumers. 
  
In the current context of the international financial crisis, results from the study 
allow us to shed light on some of the possible effects on banking margins. The Mexican 
banking system is one of the sectors of the economy which has most suffered because of 
the successive crises that the country has gone through over the years (such as in 1995). 
The deterioration of macroeconomic conditions with the consequent increase in bad 
loans can pressure bank margins to rise caused by the greater risk premiums that banks 
will demand.  
 
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
literature that analyzes the determinants of the intermediation margins. Section 3 
models the intermediation margin integrating into a single model the various extensions 
made to the original model by Ho and Saunders (1981). Section 4 specifies the sample 
used and presents the empirical results. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
  
2. Literature review 
 
The initial study on the determinants of bank interest margins by Ho and 
Saunders (1981) modeled the behavior of a bank that acts as intermediary between 
lenders and borrowers. The theoretical model indicates that the optimum bank interest 
margin depends on four factors: the degree of risk aversion, the market structure, the 
average size of bank transactions and the variance of the interest rate on loans and 
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deposits. Ho and Saunders empirically estimate the model for the U.S. banks, using a 
two step approach. In the first step, they estimate a regression of the individual bank’s 
interest margin against bank-specific variables (implicit interest rate, opportunity cost of 
reserves, default premium) i.e. against variables that are not determined in the 
theoretical model. The constant term of this regression represents an estimate of the 
“pure spread” component for the banks, i.e. the portion of the margin that cannot be 
explained by bank-specific characteristics. In the second stage, they estimate a 
regression of the “pure spread” as a function of the volatility of interest rates. The 
constant term captures the effect of market structure on the determination of the “pure 
spread”, and the coefficient of the explanatory variable measures the sensitivity of “pure 
spread” to variations in the volatility of interest rates for a number of maturities. 
 
The original model by Ho and Saunders (1981) has been extended theoretically 
and estimated empirically by other authors. Thus, Allen (1988) extends it for various 
types of loans with interdependent demands and concludes that pure interest spreads 
may be reduced when cross-elasticities of demand between bank products are 
considered. Angbazo (1997) introduces credit risk and interest rate risk into the 
theoretical model, as well as the interaction between these two types of risk, and 
estimates it for U.S. commercial banks in 1989-93. Subsequently, the model is 
estimated empirically using a two step process by Saunders and Schumacher (2000) for 
the U.S. banking system and six European countries in 1988-95, and by Brock and 
Rojas (2000) for five Latin American countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile 
and Peru). 
 
Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004) make an interesting recent 
contribution. They expand the theoretical model by considering the importance of 
operating costs as a determinant of net interest income, and estimate it empirically for 
the main European banking sectors in the period 1992-2000. Furthermore, they use 
direct measurements of market power (Lerner index) instead of structural indicators of 
competition (market concentration indicators).  The authors conclude that the increase 
in the Lerner index in European banks had a positive effect on the interest margin. This 
effect, however, was counteracted by the fall in operating costs, credit risk and implicit 
interest of payments, as well as the lower volatility of market interest rates. The authors 
find therefore that a situation of lower intermediation margins is compatible with 
increases in market power. The same expanded model by Maudos and Fernández de 
Guevara (2004) is estimated for the Spanish banking system for the period 1992-99 by 
Fernández de Guevara (2004). 
 
 8
Martínez and Mody (2004) study the impact of foreign participation and 
concentration on Latin American bank spreads (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico 
and Peru) and find that foreign banks are able to charge lower spreads and have lower 
costs than domestic banks. Moreover, those foreign banks that acquired domestic 
institutions have higher spreads than those that established de novo operations. On the 
other hand, the degree of concentration in the banking system has a positive and 
economically significant impact on both spreads. Gelos (2006) explains the differences 
between the levels of spread in Latin American banking systems and other emerging 
economies by analyzing the determinants of bank interest margins in a sample of 85 
countries, including 14 Latin American economies. The author concludes that, in 
comparison to other emerging economies, spreads in Latin American banking markets 
are higher because of less efficient banks (weaker competition), relatively higher levels 
of interest rates and higher reserve requirements. 
 
Another important contribution is that by Carbó and Rodríguez (2007). The 
authors develop the theoretical model by including both traditional and non-traditional 
activities, with the aim of studying the effect of specialization on bank margins using a 
multi-output model for European banking. In order to do this, they estimate a dynamic 
model, considering that banks need to match the random deposit supply function and 
the random demand of lending and non-traditional activities across periods. Their 
results show that diversification in non-traditional activities causes an increase in 
market power, and a decrease in spread as a consequence of cross-subsidization.  
 
Another study that analyzes empirically the implications for bank interest 
margins of the expansion into non-traditional fee-based activities is Lepetit et al. 
(2008). These authors test for a possible cross-selling behavior of interest and non-
interest products by analyzing the determinants of the risk premium charged by banks 
on their loans for the European banking system (1996-2002).  
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1 An integrated model of the net interest margin 
 
The seminal model by Ho and Saunders (1981) has been extended in later studies by 
incorporating different factors to explain the net interest margin (Allen, 1988, Angbazo, 
1997; Maudos and Fernández de Guevara, 2004; Carbó and Rodríguez, 2007). 
However, until now all the individual contributions have not been integrated into a 
single model. This section therefore aims to construct a complete integrated model of 
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the determinants of net interest income simultaneously including operating costs, and 
diversification and specialization variables.  
 
The essence of the model is to consider that the representative bank is a risk-
averse agent that acts as intermediary between suppliers of deposits, and demanders of 
loans and non-interest outputs. The bank is also maximizer of its expected utility of 
terminal wealth in a single period. The bank faces the risk that there will be changes in 
interest rates in the money market and the uncertainty of the return on net credit. It 
therefore sets the interest rates (deposits rD, loans rL and non-traditional outputs rN) as a 
margin over the money market interest rate (r) in order to cover itself against these 
risks. The planning horizon is a single period, and it is assumed that the banks set 
interest rates before transactions are entered into and that they remain constant until the 
end of the period. It is also assumed that the size of transactions in loans, deposits and 
non-traditional output is a fixed constant Q (see Ho and Saunders, 1981). 
 
Based on the multi-product framework by Carbó and Rodriguez (2007), the 
interest margin will be equal to a+bL (the immediacy fees for providing deposits and 
loans, respectively) and the gross margin will be a+bL+bN (where bN is the fee charged 
for non-traditional activities). If we assume, as Maudos and Fernández de Guevera 
(2004) do, that operating costs (C) are a function of the traditional and non-traditional 
activities, the first order conditions of the maximization problem yield the optimum 
intermediation margin (see the appendix): 
 
( )
2 21 ( ) ( ) 2
2 2 2
2
2 1
4
D L
L I M IM
D L
NL
N
L L
C D C L RQa b
Q
C N
b RY
Q
α α σ σ σβ β
δδ
β δ
⎛ ⎞ + ⎡ ⎤+ = + + + + −⎜ ⎟ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪+ + − −⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭
   (1) 
 
where α/β (proxy for market power) is the ratio of the intercept (α) and the slope (β) of 
the deposit and loan arrival functions of the bank, Q is the output transaction size, 
"/ 'R U U≡ −  is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion (U’>0 and U’’<0), σ2I is the 
variance of shochastic output inventory (which captures the uncertainty of the returns on 
net credit), σ2M is the volatility in the money market interest rate, σIM  is the covariance 
between credit risk and market risk, δL and δN are the cross-elasticities of demand across 
bank loans and non-traditional activities, and 
( ) ( ) ( )2 20 0 0 02 2 2I M IMY Q I Q M M I Qσ σ σ= + + − + − − . 
 
In the case of the optimal gross margin a+bL+bN: 
 10
 
( ) ( )
2
0
2
0 0 0
1 ( ) ( ) ( ) (3 2 )
2 2 4
(3 2 ) 2( 3 )
12 1 1
4 2
ND L
L N I
D L N
M IM
L NN N LL L L
N
L N L L N L N
C D C L C N RQa b b Q I
Q
Q M M I Q
C N C Lb b RY
Q
αα α σβ β β
σ σ
δ δδ δ βδ β
β β δ δ β β β
⎛ ⎞ + + ⎡+ + = + + + + +⎜ ⎟ ⎣⎝ ⎠
⎤+ − + − − ⎦
⎧ ⎫ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪+ + + − + − +⎨ ⎬ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭
     (2) 
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L
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δ
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, the  
introduction of non-traditional activities reduces interest margin. Observe that when 
non-traditional activities are included, the margin is modified with the effect of market 
power, operating costs, the cross elasticities of demand across bank loans and non-
traditional output, as well as by credit and market risks. 
 
In addition to the variables posited by the theoretical model as determinants of 
pure spread, the empirical evidence shows that other variables also affect the net interest 
margin and must therefore be included in the empirical estimation of the model. Taking 
previous studies as reference, the following variables are used:  
 
a) Implicit interest payment represents extra payments to depositors through services 
charge remission or other types of transfers. As this variable represents an additional 
expense, the bank will set a higher margin, so a positive relationship is expected (Ho 
and Saunders, 1981; Angbazo, 1997; Saunders and Schumacher, 2000; Maudos and 
Fernández de Guevara, 2004).  
 
b) The opportunity cost of keeping reserves: this represents an opportunity cost to the 
banks of not maintaining high-yielding assets, so the banks with high levels of 
reserves pass this cost on to borrowers by means of a high intermediation margin 
(Ho and Saunders, 1981; Angbazo, 1997; Saunders and Schumacher, 2000; Maudos 
and Fernández de Guevara, 2004).  
 
c) The quality of management. Because banks which are inefficient in their 
management select less profitable assets and high-cost liabilities, their 
intermediation margins are therefore lower (Angbazo, 1997; Maudos and Fernández 
de Guevara, 2004).  
 
 11
d) Following Carbó and Rodríguez (2007), we consider specialization variables. Banks 
specializing in typical products of banking intermediation (loans and deposits) 
obtain reduced intermediation costs due to the existence of economies of scale, 
which translates into lower margins. 
 
Additionally, and with the aim of controlling for the possible effect of 
macroeconomic conditions on the evolution of the intermediation margin, the following 
variables are frequently introduced: 
 
e) GDP growth. The sign is not determined a priori. On the one hand, some studies 
show that margins are pro-cycle (Drakos, 2002; Claey and Vander Vennet, 2007), 
while in others the margin is counter-cycle (Martínez and Mody, 2004; Gelos, 2006; 
Carbó and Rodríguez, 2007; Claey and Vander Vennet, 2007).   
 
f) Inflation rate. The sign is not determined a priori. Thus, some authors show that 
high inflation rates have an adverse effect on loan interest rates and this increase is 
reflected in higher intermediation margins (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; 
Brock and Rojas, 2000; Martinez and Mody, 2004; Claeys and Vander Vennet, 
2008). However, there is the possibility that the interest rates on liabilities may 
adjust to an inflationary shock more quickly than those on assets, so there will be a 
negative relationship between inflation and the intermediation margin (Claeys and 
Vander Vennet, 2008).  
 
 
3.2 Econometric model 
 
In this section, we describe the empirical approximation of the determinants of 
intermediation margins in the Mexican banking system. We estimate a regression model 
of the net interest income (M) (calculated as the difference between financial income 
and financial costs divided by total assets) as a function of pure spread (PS), bank-
specific variables (BS) and macroeconomic variables (ME).  
 
The model to be estimated is as follows: 
1 1 1
J K L
j j k k l
it i it it t it
j k l
M PS BS MEα β γ δ ε
= = =
= + + + +∑ ∑ ∑      (3) 
 
for t=1,…,T, where T is the number of periods observed and i=1,…,I, and I is the total 
number of banks.Therefore, subscripts i and t refer to bank i at time t, respectively. Pure 
spreads are the variables that theoretically determine the margin.  
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The variables are proxied empirically as follows: 
 
a) Market power (α/β). We use the Lerner index for total banking activity (Lerner) and 
calculate it as the difference between the price and the total marginal cost (operating 
+ financial) as a proportion of the price3. The price is proxied as the ratio of banking 
revenue4 and total assets; marginal costs are estimated from a translog total cost 
function with one output (total assets) and 3 inputs (labor, physical capital and 
lendable funds): 
 
 
( )3 3 3 20 1 2
1 1 1
3 3
2
3 1 2 3
1 1
4
1 1ln ln ln ln
2 2
1ln ln ln
2
ln
j j k
it j it jk it it it it
j j k
j j
j it it t t t it
j j
t it i i
TC w w w Y Y
Y w T T T w
T Y u
α α α β β
β γ γ γ
γ μ
= = =
= =
= + + + +
+ + + +
+ + +
∑ ∑∑
∑ ∑   (4) 
 
 where TC is the total costs, w is the price of the 3 inputs [labor (personnel 
expenditure/ number of workers), lendable funds (financial costs/deposits) and 
capital (operating expenses other than personnel costs/fixed assets)], Y is total 
assets, T is a trend that captures the effect of technical progress and μ  the 
individual fixed effects. The restrictions of symmetry and grade one 
homogeneity in input prices are imposed in the estimation.  
 
 A positive relationship between the Lerner index and the intermediation margin 
is expected, reflecting the fact that the banks with greater market power set a 
wider spread than they would in a competitive situation. 
 
b) Following Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004) and Fernández de Guevara 
(2004), operating costs (C) are measured by the ratio of operating expenses to total 
assets. 
 
c) Credit risk (σ2I) is proxied by the quotient of loan loss provisions over loans 
(Angbazo, 1997). 
 
                                                 
3 Since we have only national indicators available, which have a common value for all the banks of the 
sample, we cannot analyze the sensitivity of the results using market structure indicators. 
4 The analysis is conducted with financial income. If total income is considered robust, results are 
obtained. However, the economic impact of market power and average operating costs are greater. 
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d) Following McShane and Sharpe (1985) and Maudos and Fernández de Guevara 
(2004), the degree of risk aversion (R) is proxied by the ratio of equity to total 
assets5.  
 
e) Market risk (σ2M) is proxied by the annual standard deviation of weekly real interest 
rates on Federation Treasury Certificates (CETES) at 91 days (SD91) (Saunders and 
Schumacher, 2000). Because this variable does not present variability between 
banks, it only varies over time.  
 
f) Interaction between credit risk and market risk (σIM) is calculated as the product of 
non-performing loans/loans and market risk. Since (loan loss 
provisions/loans)*SD91 presents multicollinearity with SD91, non-performing 
loans/loans is used as proxy for credit risk. 
 
g) Transaction size (Q=size). Although we do not have information to proxy the 
transactions made, we include the logarithm of loans as proxy of size, as suggested 
by Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004). 
 
h) Net non-interest income (nii) is calculated as the ratio of net non-interest income 
(non-interest income minus non-interest expenses) as a percentage of total assets6. A 
diversified bank is expected be able to offer its traditional products with very small 
and even negative margins (with the aim of attracting or keeping clients), and 
recuperates this loss by setting higher fees. Its income from non-interest activities 
therefore increases, reflecting a cross-subsidization strategy7.  
 
i) Income from fees and commissions (fee) is proxied by net fee income/total assets. 
Its expected sign is negative.  
 
j) Income from trading (trade) represents profits and losses generated by buying and 
selling securities and currencies, as well as the revaluation of banks’ positions in 
securities. It is proxied by nii minus fee. 
 
                                                 
5 A better proxy of this variable would be the capital held in excess of regulatory capital. However, this 
variable is not available. Since the variable used is a measure of capitalization, the results are influenced 
by regulation on minimum equity.  
6 Initially, this variable was estimated in terms of net operating income (Lepetit et al., 2008). However, it 
presents collinearity with the efficiency of banking management. This problem is avoided by redefining 
the variable in terms of total assets.  
7 Banks usually have different product mixes, which may influence the pricing of loan products. 
Therefore, banks with well-developed non-interest income sources may have lower interest margins due 
to cross-subsidization of bank activities. 
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As mentioned above, although not considered explicitly in the theoretical model, 
there are other variables which influence margins. Using previous studies as reference, 
the variables are proxied as follows:  
 
k) Implicit Interest Payments are obtained as the difference between non interest 
expense and other operating income in terms of total assets8. 
 
l) The opportunity cost of holding reserves is estimated by the ratio of liquid reserves 
(proxied by cash variable) to total assets. 
 
m) The quality of management (Efficiency) is proxied by the cost to gross income ratio. 
Because high levels of operating cost per unit of gross income reflect banks that are 
not efficient in their management, they select less profitable assets and high-cost 
liabilities. Thus, a negative sign is expected. 
 
n) The loans/total assets and deposits/total assets ratios are considered to be 
specialization variables.  
 
Finally, as macroeconomic variables:  
 
o) GDP growth (GDP) in constant 1993 Mexican pesos. 
 
p) Inflation rate (inflation). Growth rate of the consumer price index (annual inflation 
rate). 
 
4. Sample and Results 
 
The sample used is formed by an unbalanced panel of data from 289 annual 
observations, corresponding to 43 commercial banks for the period between 1993 and 
2005, which represent an average of 92% of the total assets in the Mexican commercial 
banking system during the period of study9. The data are obtained from the Statistical 
Bulletin of the Multiple Banking system of the National Banking and Securities 
Commission (known by its Spanish acronym CNBV), and from the Basic Banking 
                                                 
8 To begin with, this variable was estimated in terms of net operating income. However, it presents 
collinearity with operating costs. To avoid this problem, it is redefined by changing the scale. 
9 We eliminated from the sample any observations of doubtful reliability, and banks that did not report 
information for some of the variables necessary for estimating the indicators of competition. Because of 
these restrictions, the number of observations varies from a minimum of 13 in 1993 to a maximum of 32 
in 1996.  
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Information System of the Bank of Mexico. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of 
the net interest margins and their determinants, as well as the number of observations in 
each year. 
 
Equation (2) is estimated with fixed effects in order to capture the influence of 
specific variables of each bank. Temporal effects are not included because they present 
multicollinearity with the volatility of the market interest rate. 
 
The results of the different estimations are presented in table 2.  First, the most 
general case is estimated (column 1). Next, the diversification variables are included, in 
the aggregate and disaggregated (columns 2, 4 and 3, 5, respectively). Finally, 
specialization variables are included (columns 4 and 5). In general, the expected signs 
are obtained in the coefficients of the variables considered in the literature. In the case 
of the variables that capture the influence of macroeconomic conditions (GDP, 
inflation), they are not reported in the tables as they are not statistically significant. 
 
In all cases, the signs of the coefficients of the Lerner index are positive and 
significant at 1%, reflecting the fact that the banks with greatest market power set 
highest margins. The result is compatible with that obtained by Maudos and Fernández 
de Guevara (2004) for the main European banking sectors.  
 
The coefficients of operating costs are statistically significant (1%), with the 
positive signs indicating that banks with high costs have to operate with higher 
intermediation margins to cover their higher operating costs. This result is consistent 
with that obtained by Brock and Rojas (2000), Martínez and Mody (2004), Gelos (2006) 
for Latin-American banks; Fernández de Guevara (2004) for Spanish banks; and 
Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004) for European banks.  
 
As, predicted by the theoretical model, positive and significant signs are 
obtained in the variables risk aversion, interest rate risk and credit rate risk, and we can 
observe that banks will set higher interest rates in order to obtain higher margins. 
However, credit risk is significant only in columns 1, 2 and 4. When we compare the 
results with other countries of Latin America, the positive sign of credit risk is 
consistent with that obtained by Brock and Rojas (2000) in the Colombian banking 
system but differs from the negative sign obtained by these same authors in the 
Argentine, Bolivian, Chilean and Peruvian systems10.  
 
                                                 
10 Brock and Rojas (2000) proxy the credit risk variable with the ratio of non-performing loans to total 
loans. 
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The interaction between the two risks is negative and significant, implying that 
the greater the volatility of interest rates and the greater the exposure to default risk, the 
less the effect on the interest margin. The negative sign may be explained by the result 
obtained by Brock and Rojas (2000) that non-performing loans are associated with 
smaller spreads in some countries of Latin America because of inadequate provisioning 
for loan losses. Another possible explanation given by the authors is that, on the 
assumption that banking authorities are reluctant to close banks in trouble and may 
encourage high risk, banks with a high proportion of bad loans may lower spreads as a 
way of trying to solve their problems. This latter explanation can be applied to the 
Mexican case given the unlimited deposit insurance (Fund for the Protection of Bank 
Savings, known by its Spanish acronym, FOBAPROA) which led the banks to incur 
high levels of credit risk, and thus aggravated the problems of moral hazard11. 
 
Another determinant is the size of the transactions. The results show that banks 
with larger operations incur a high risk, and thus charge a higher margin. On the other 
hand, banking institutions with low implicit interest payments will set lower margins. In 
addition, the expected (negative) sign is obtained in the efficiency of banking 
management. Finally, the effect of with the opportunity cost of holding reserves is not 
statistically significant.  
 
The introduction of the non-interest income variable has a negative and 
significant effect, showing that more diversified banks have lower intermediation 
margins; this may reflect a strategy of cross-subsidization with traditional activities 
(Carbó and Rodríguez, 2007; and Lepetit et al., 2008). Since banks engage in different 
non-lending activities, these other activities may influence the pricing of loan products 
due to cross-subsidization of bank products12. When the non-interest income variable is 
disaggregated into fee based activities and trading income, both present negative signs, 
although only the fee variable is significant.  
 
With the aim of valuing the economic impact of the determinants of the 
intermediation margin, the bottom of table 2 shows the  elasticities of the explanatory 
variables and their statistical significance. The most significant effects correspond to the 
market power, operating costs and risk aversion. The impact of the Lerner index is the 
most significant: when market power decreases by 10%, ceteris paribus, the margin 
decreases between 4.7% and 4.9%. The effect of average operating costs is also high; 
                                                 
11 A detailed description of the rescue of the Mexican banking system can be found in Murillo (2002), 
Haber (2005), and Hernández (2007). 
12 For example, banks may reduce lending rates to borrowers who also use bank services which generate 
fee and commission income, such as underwriting of securities. 
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when this variable increases by 10%, the margin increases between 3.6% and 3.8%; and 
when risk aversion decreases by 10%, the margin is reduced by between 2.9% and 
3.1%. The effect of the remaining variables is insignificant (see bottom of table 2). 
 
Since the dependent variable analyzed (the intermediation margin) presents 
inertia in time because the banks need to match the random deposit supply function and 
the random demand of lending and non-traditional activities across periods, it is 
considered that the current values of the margins may be determined by their previous 
values (Carbó and Rodríguez, 2007). We therefore estimate the following dynamic 
model: 
 
1
1 1
J K
j j k k
it it it it i it
j k
M M PS BSξ β γ η υ−
= =
= + + + +∑ ∑          (5) 
 
where iη  is an unobserved time-invariant bank-specific effect and itυ  is a disturbance 
term. Given that the explanatory variables and the dependent variable are correlated 
with iη , a transformation such as first-differencing is required to eliminate the 
individual effects.  
 
For this purpose, we use the methodology proposed by Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), estimating a system of equations in both first-
differences and levels (the “system” GMM estimator). The system GMM estimator thus 
combines the standard set of equations in first-differences with suitably lagged levels as 
instruments, and an additional set of equations in levels with suitably lagged first-
differences as instruments. Two-step GMM estimators are used with asymptotic 
standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity (see table 3). In addition, and considering 
the small sample used, the two-step standard errors are computed in accordance to the 
Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction13. Furthermore, we consider the possibility 
that the explanatory variables are not strictly exogenous, such as the Lerner index and 
                                                 
13 It is important to point out that there are two possible problems with the  system GMM estimator. First, 
asymptotic standard errors of the efficient two-step GMM estimator can be severely downward biased in 
small samples. In order to avoid this problem, the Windmeijer correction (2005) is used. The inference of 
the results is robust if we estimate the dynamic model with the one-step GMM estimator. Hayakawa 
(2006) analyzes the small sample bias properties of the system GMM estimators in dynamic panel data 
models. He provides theoretical evidence as to why the system GMM estimator has smaller bias.Second, 
when the number of banks is low in comparison to the number of years overfitting biases can be present 
when using all the available moment conditions and the Sargan test may be weak. To avoid overfitting 
biases, instrument sets were restricted. For robustness, we estimate an alternative approach to the system 
GMM estimator for small samples, Least-Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimator corrected for small 
simple bias (Kiviet, 1995; Bun and Kiviet, 2003 and Bruno 2005) and the system GMM results hold. 
These results are available upon request. 
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non interest income. Endogenity can arise, for instance, when causality is reversed, i.e., 
when the degree of market power or the importance of non-interest income depend on 
banking margins.  If a bank operates with a low interest margin, it is possible that it tries 
to compensate for this low margin by an increase in non-interest income (such as fees 
and commissions). In the case of the Lerner index, because of the endogeneity of the 
cost and price variables, the variable is not exogenous. To address this potential 
endogeneity, we use lagged levels and lagged differences of the explanatory variables as 
instruments14. 
 
In order to determine the consistency of the estimators, we verify the validity of 
the instruments and test lack of serial correlation (Arellano and Bond, 1991) by using 
the Hansen over-identifying test. No evidence is found to reject the null hypothesis that 
the model is correctly specified and the instruments are valid. In addition, to test the 
additional moment conditions used in the levels equation, the Hansen Difference 
statistic was used. According to this test, we accept their validity. 
 
We use the statistic proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) to test the absence of 
serial correlation of the errors in levels. This statistic tests the absence of second-order 
serial correlation of the first difference residuals. The evidence shows first-order serial 
correlation in differences (by construction) but no significant second-order serial 
correlation. Therefore, as Hansen's null hypotheses and the serial correlation tests are 
not rejected, the implementation of the dynamic model is validated. 
 
As was to be expected, inertia exists, and therefore the first order autoregressive 
component AR(1) is significant at 10% or less (see table 3). This indicates that a proper 
specification of the net interest margin must include an inertia term. In all cases, a 
positive and significant relation is maintained between the net interest margin and the 
variables market power, operating cost, market risk, and implicit interest payments.  
Risk aversion, credit risk and size have the expected sign but are not significant in all 
specifications.  
 
Furthermore, there is a negative and significant relationship between the 
intermediation margin and efficiency in banking management. There is also a negative 
relationship between the dependent variable and the interaction between credit risk and 
interest risk (except column 1). Once again we find evidence that more diversified 
banks have lower intermediation margins. However, when non interest income is 
decomposed, we observe that trading income is significant only in column 3. 
                                                 
14 As mentioned before,  to avoid overfitting biases, we restrict the lag ranges used in generating these 
instrument sets and we collapse them (Roodman, 2006). 
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Deposits/total assets does not significantly affect the interest margin. Finally, the 
significant negative sign of the coefficient of the specialization variable in the loans 
market may be explained by the result obtained by Maudos and Solís (2007 and 2008). 
That is to say, there is greater competitive rivalry in the loans market because there is 
cross-subsidization with deposits. Therefore, given there is greater competition in this 
sector, they set lower interest rates, ceteris paribus, and consequently a lower 
intermediation margin. Another possible explanation is that when banks specialize in 
the loans market, they reduce their intermediation costs thanks to the existence of 
economies of scale which translate into lower margins (columns 4 and 5 of table 3).  
 
The elasticities in the dynamic model are likewise calculated. It is observed that 
the economic impact of the operating cost on the net interest margin is greater when we 
consider that the current values of the net interest margin are determined by its previous 
values. When the operating cost increases by 10%, ceteris paribus, the margin increases 
between 4.7% (5.8%) and 5.8% (7.2%) in the short (long)-term. However, if the banks 
decrease the Lerner index by 10%, their margins will decrease between 4.3% (5.4%) 
and 5.3% (6.5%) in the short (long)-term. The economic impact of the rest of the 
variables is analyzed in a similar manner (see bottom of table 3)15.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In comparison to international standards, Mexico has high banking margins that 
reflect high intermediation costs. This has a negative effect on the growth of savings, 
investment, employment and, consequently, the country’s economic growth. These 
reasons justify the importance of analyzing the determinants of intermediation margins 
in the Mexican banking system for the period 1993-2005,  
 
The contributions of the paper in relation to other studies on the banking system 
are as follows. First, we develop theoretically a complete model that includes previous 
contributions by other authors, incorporating the original model by Ho and Saunders 
(1981), and average operating costs and non-traditional activities (Allen, 1988; 
Angbazo, 1997; Maudos and Fernández de Guevara, 2004; Carbó and Rodríguez, 
2007).  Second, the model is estimated empirically for the Mexican banking system for 
the first time. Moreover, following Carbó and Rodríguez (2007), we consider that the 
current values of the margins may be determined by their previous values, due to the 
                                                 
15 To test the robustness of the results, we estimate both the static and the dynamic models, using the 
differential between the interest rate on deposits and the inter-bank 28 day rate as proxy of market risk. 
The results are robust and are available upon request to the authors. 
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existence of symmetric deposit, loan and non-traditional output arrival functions of the 
bank which may have different time patterns. Finally, we calculate the economic impact 
of the determinants on the net interest margin. 
 
The results show that the most significant economic impact on the 
intermediation margin is determined by average operating costs and the Lerner index 
and the long-term elasticities are higher than those of short term. The results also show 
that, in general, we obtain the signs expected in the coefficients of the variables 
considered in the literature, explaining net interest income. Thus, we find evidence that 
the banks set higher intermediation margins if they enjoy greater market power. 
Furthermore, banking firms with high operating costs pass these on to their clients by 
setting higher rates of interest on credits and lower rates of interest on deposits, 
therefore leading to higher intermediation margins. The banks also protect themselves 
from a high volatility of market interest rates by charging higher net interest margins. In 
addition, we observe that banks that are not efficient in their management select less 
profitable assets and high-cost liabilities, leading to lower margins. Banks with high 
levels of implicit interest payment will set a higher margin because this variable 
represents an additional expense. 
 
With regard to the diversification variable, we can conclude that, just as in more 
developed countries, non-interest income has increased during recent years and the sign 
of its coefficient shows that more diversified banks have lower intermediation margins, 
which may reflect a strategy of cross-subsidization with traditional activities (Carbó and 
Rodríguez, 2007; and Lepetit et al., 2008). This result suggests that well-developed fee 
income sources produces lower interest margins due to cross-subsidization of bank 
activities. The strengthened importance of fee-based (and other) income has affected the 
income structure of the Mexican banking system, increasing the weight of the non-
interest income in total income (see figure 1). However, its economic impact is low, so 
the net interest margin has not decreased (unlike in developed countries), as the effect of 
market power and of average operating costs predominate, causing the margin to 
continue with high levels compared to international standards.  
 
The model estimated serves to explain the evolution of net interest income in 
Mexico. The results obtained indicate that its evolution (which has not shown a 
downward trend as has occurred in developed countries) is consistent with that of 
average operating costs (except for 1995 and 2002) and the Lerner index (except for 
1995 and 2000-01). (See figure 1). If we analyze its evolution in relation to the 
measures implemented in the Mexican banking system, we can observe that in the sub-
period following the sale of the banks to the private sector (1993-94), the net interest 
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margin decreases. This trend is provoked by the fall in market power and in operating 
costs. Subsequently, the exchange rate crisis had an adverse effect on inflation, and on 
interest rates and their volatility. Credit risk and risk aversion have also been affected,  
causing an increase in the net interest margin. However, this increase is not as 
significant because it is counteracted by the decrease in market power. In the sub-period 
of restructuring and starting the consolidation of the Mexican banking system (1996-
99), the net interest margin increased as a consequence of the increase in the Lerner 
index and in average operating costs. However, the margin decreased from 2000 to 
2003. This effect is explained by the fall of 2000 and 2001 (2002 and 2003) in average 
operating costs (slight fall in market power), credit risk, implicit interest payments 
counteracting the increase in market power (average operating costs). Finally, at the end 
of the period analyzed (2004-05), we observe a tendency for the interest margin to 
increase (as the Banco de México (2008) assets. This tendency is due to growth of the 
credit granted to the private sector, particularly to households and SMEs, and the 
bancarization process that rearch segment of the population with more risk), propitiated 
by a context of rising interest rates and also by an increase in market power16.  
 
From an economic policy orientation, the results obtained permit us to conclude 
that policies should be aimed at increasing competition and promoting efficiency in the 
banking sector, and at favoring stable macroeconomic conditions. In terms of 
competition, the evidence contributed by other works (along with the complaints made 
by a group of senators urging the Bank of Mexico to regulate the maximum interest rate 
banks should be allowed to charge) show that monopolistic practices exist in some 
important markets. It is therefore necessary to prioritize measures aimed at increasing 
competition (such as decreasing the legal barriers to some products and fostering 
coordination between anti-trust authorities and regulators). Regarding efficiency, it is 
important that the Mexican banking system reduces its costs, which lower margins and 
benefit consumers. Finally, in the current international financial crisis, results from the 
study allow us to shed light on some of the possible effects on banking margins. The 
Mexican banking system is one of the sectors of the economy which has most suffered 
because of the successive crises that the country has gone through over the years (such 
as in 1995). The current deterioration of macroeconomic conditions with the consequent 
increase in bad loans can pressure bank margins to rise caused by the greater risk 
premiums that will banks demand.  
 
 
                                                 
16 Solís and Maudos (2008) show that since 1998, and with great intensity in 2004 and 2005, the  market 
has increased substantially, tripling its value to reach the highest level in 2005. In parallel, the levels of 
profitability (ROA) of the Mexican banking sector have increased substantially since 1998, especially in 
2004 a 2005. In the same period, there has been an increase in the market concentration (CR3). 
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Appendix  
 
Banks are maximizers of their expected utility of their wealth (W) and their 
utility function is proxied using the Taylor expansion around ( )TE W W= . Thus, the 
change in the expected utility after a transaction Q -a new deposit (Q=D), loan (Q=L) 
or non-traditional output (Q=N)– is given by: 
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where it is assumed that the bank’s utility function is continuous doubly differentiable 
with U’>0 and U’’<0, i.e. the bank is risk averse. 
 
Given the probabilities λ of receiving a deposit, granting a loan and selling a 
non-traditional output (Ho and Saunders, 1981; Allen, 1988; Carbó and Rodríguez, 
2007), the bank seeks to maximize the expected utility of its wealth: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
, ,
.1 .2 .3
L N
L Na b b
Max EU W a A b A b Aλ λ λΔ = + +   (A.4) 
 
Solving for the different bank fees, the first order conditions yield the following 
expressions of the immediacy fees:17 
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17 As in Ho and Saunders (1981), the second order immediacy fees are assumed to be negligible. 
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where: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )2 20 0 0 02 2 2I M IMY Q I Q M M I Qσ σ σ= + + − + − −    (A.8) 
           "/ 'R U U≡ −  is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion                              (A.9) 
 
The optimal interest margin a+bL is given by expression (1), and the optimal gross 
margin a+bL+bN by expression (2). 
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Figure 1. Evolution of the net interest margin and its determinants18  
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18  Indicators for the totality of the commercial banks reported by the CNBV, except for the Lerner index which is estimated from sample data. 
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Table 1. Sample descriptive statistics 
Net interest 
margin
Market 
power
Operating 
cost
Risk 
aversion
Interest rate 
risk 
Credit risk Size
Implicit 
Interest 
Payments
Opportunity 
cost of 
holding 
reserves
Quality of 
management
Fees and 
commissions
Trading 
income
Net non 
interest 
income
(Financial 
income-
Financial 
Expenses)/TA
Lerner 1/
Operating 
cost/TA
Equity/TA SD cetes 91
Loan loss 
provision/loans
ln(loans)
(Non-interest 
expense-other 
operating 
income)/TA
Liquid 
reserves/TA
Operating 
cost/gross 
income
Loans/TA Deposits/TA
Net fee 
income
Net non 
interest 
income - net 
fee income
Non interest 
income-non 
interest 
expenses
Mean 0.0550 0.0577 0.0408 0.0630 1.4117 0.0145 9.5647 0.3458 0.0253 0.6039 0.6188 0.5578 0.0043 0.0021 0.0158
Standard 
deviation 0.0227 0.0759 0.0088 0.0311 0.0000 0.0113 1.1541 0.1244 0.0120 0.1201 0.1972 0.1401 0.0016 0.0081 0.0047
Mean 0.0434 0.0174 0.0354 0.0505 3.7207 0.0196 9.6768 0.4192 0.0244 0.6580 0.6244 0.5086 0.0036 -0.0035 0.0130
Standard 
deviation 0.0181 0.0869 0.0085 0.0156 0.0000 0.0096 1.2347 0.1960 0.0133 0.1403 0.1922 0.1205 0.0022 0.0111 0.0069
Mean 0.0479 -0.0232 0.0333 0.1095 20.5037 0.0249 7.9901 0.3762 0.0606 0.6835 0.5812 0.5385 0.0025 -0.0044 0.0147
Standard 
deviation 0.0383 0.0970 0.0096 0.0859 0.0000 0.0207 2.3172 0.6066 0.0933 0.5752 0.2412 0.1274 0.0042 0.0208 0.0136
Mean 0.0321 -0.0465 0.0342 0.1059 3.7212 0.0183 7.4647 0.4948 0.0556 0.8590 0.4857 0.4265 0.0028 0.0021 0.0156
Standard 
deviation 0.0220 0.1005 0.0132 0.0835 0.0000 0.0203 2.1999 0.6277 0.0938 0.5275 0.2344 0.2146 0.0031 0.0151 0.0128
Mean 0.0544 -0.0377 0.0593 0.1796 2.4620 0.0065 7.1787 0.9957 0.1164 1.2410 0.6660 0.5549 0.0063 -0.0025 0.0085
Standard 
deviation 0.0312 0.1304 0.0365 0.1408 0.0000 0.0090 2.0816 1.8107 0.1003 1.6696 0.1754 0.1846 0.0057 0.0128 0.0143
Mean 0.0551 0.0162 0.0538 0.1722 7.2513 0.0127 7.5621 0.9119 0.1433 1.1319 0.6771 0.5272 0.0065 -0.0021 0.0128
Standard 
deviation 0.0335 0.1067 0.0425 0.1564 0.0000 0.0120 2.1589 2.2273 0.0989 1.8997 0.1795 0.2403 0.0063 0.0181 0.0173
Mean 0.0564 0.0452 0.0567 0.1567 2.9763 0.0206 7.3319 0.6089 0.2048 0.9852 0.6131 0.6556 0.0080 0.0026 0.0225
Standard 
deviation 0.0389 0.1077 0.0297 0.1209 0.0000 0.0243 2.0445 0.9323 0.1634 0.6947 0.2099 0.1867 0.0060 0.0241 0.0227
Mean 0.0482 0.0457 0.0562 0.1710 1.5339 0.0136 7.1434 0.5255 0.1911 0.9313 0.5668 0.5481 0.0084 0.0040 0.0200
Standard 
deviation 0.0316 0.1012 0.0370 0.1095 0.0000 0.0190 2.1336 0.6988 0.1437 0.6347 0.2451 0.1904 0.0071 0.0155 0.0159
Mean 0.0394 0.0678 0.0553 0.1324 2.9785 0.0183 7.2251 0.3015 0.2625 1.1933 0.5452 0.6613 0.0076 0.0065 0.0248
Standard 
deviation 0.0411 0.1036 0.0552 0.0914 0.0000 0.0175 2.4510 1.3488 0.2043 1.2909 0.2547 0.1860 0.0067 0.0208 0.0198
Mean 0.0468 0.0666 0.0517 0.1608 0.7267 0.0296 7.5313 0.6495 0.1744 0.9488 0.5577 0.5892 0.0093 0.0009 0.0183
Standard 
deviation 0.0210 0.1123 0.0292 0.1328 0.0000 0.0777 2.4965 0.6466 0.0960 0.7458 0.2360 0.1973 0.0077 0.0171 0.0156
Mean 0.0424 0.0651 0.0397 0.1280 1.0487 0.0119 7.9353 0.4064 0.1580 0.7134 0.5947 0.5933 0.0103 0.0023 0.0191
Standard 
deviation 0.0166 0.0999 0.0144 0.0730 0.0000 0.0168 1.9250 0.2915 0.0633 0.2230 0.2119 0.2164 0.0080 0.0144 0.0124
Mean 0.0439 0.1323 0.0402 0.1165 0.7970 0.0091 7.9738 0.5032 0.1916 0.7713 0.5646 0.6132 0.0115 0.0004 0.0169
Standard 
deviation 0.0199 0.0750 0.0150 0.0548 0.0000 0.0082 1.8396 0.3426 0.1068 0.2918 0.2020 0.2196 0.0087 0.0054 0.0109
Mean 0.0574 0.1587 0.0472 0.1467 0.4572 0.0088 7.8836 0.5436 0.2058 0.7028 0.5684 0.6014 0.0104 0.0009 0.0165
Standard 
deviation 0.0285 0.0660 0.0231 0.0921 0.0000 0.0091 2.0033 0.6956 0.1088 0.2906 0.2112 0.2102 0.0085 0.0117 0.0159
1/ Weighted mean (Weight= total assets)
Source: Own elaboration based on data from Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores  and Banco de México .
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18
32
31
24
25
24
24
2004
2005
Year Statistics
2000
2001
2002
2003
1996
1997
1998
1999
Specialization Variables
1993
1994
1995
Banks
13
14
24
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Table 2. Determinants of the net interest margin 
(Static model) 
Variable
Lerner 0.1161 * 0.1136 * 0.1112 * 0.1133 * 0.1108 *
(9.29) (9.01) (8.24) (8.98) (8.19)
Operating Cost / total assets 0.3653 * 0.3776 * 0.3843 * 0.3814 * 0.3846 *
(5.82) (5.67) (5.20) (5.18) (4.8)
Equity / total assets 0.1098 * 0.1049 * 0.1098 * 0.1017 * 0.1074 *
(3.68) (3.54) (3.68) (3.44) (3.60)
SD91 0.0006 ** 0.0007 *** 0.0006 ** 0.0007 * 0.0006 **
(2.4) (2.70) (2.48) (2.72) (2.51)
Loan loss provisions / loans 0.0794 ** 0.0975 *** 0.0696 0.1019 * 0.0717
(2.11) (2.62) (1.44) (2.79) (1.47)
SD91*(non-performing loans/loans) -0.0062 *** -0.0072 ** -0.0081 ** -0.0075 ** -0.0083 **
(-1.87) (-2.23) (-2.52) (-2.33) (-2.58)
Size 0.0041 * 0.0047 * 0.0044 * 0.0045 ** 0.0041 **
(3.02) (3.40) (3.07) (2.17) (1.94)
Implicit Interest Payments 0.0028 ** 0.0025 *** 0.0030 ** 0.0025 *** 0.0029 **
(2.04) (1.92) (2.07) (1.93) (2.07)
Liquid reserves / total assets 0.0006 0.0031 0.0059 0.0079 0.0093
(0.06) (0.26) (0.47) (0.56) (0.65)
Efficiency -0.0042 ** -0.0038 *** -0.0045 ** -0.0037 *** -0.0045 **
(-2.05) (-1.92) (-2.07) (-1.94) (-2.07)
Non-interest income -0.1776 *** -0.1779 ***
(-1.75) (-1.68)
Fee -0.4569 *** -0.4459 ***
(-1.75) (-1.67)
Trade -0.1494 -0.1491
(-1.41) (-1.38)
Loans / total assets 0.0052 0.0040
(0.58) (0.46)
Deposits / total assets -0.0062 -0.0041
(-0.66) (-0.45)
N. obs. 289 289 289 289 289
R2 0.883 0.887 0.889 0.888 0.889
Haussman test 21.69 28.19 30.42 27.99 29.77
p-value (0.017) (0.003) (0.002) (0.009) (0.008)
Lerner 0.4915 * 0.4809 * 0.4708 * 0.4795 * 0.4692 *
Operating Cost / total assets 0.3631 * 0.3753 * 0.3820 * 0.3790 * 0.3822 *
Equity / total assets 0.3140 * 0.3001 * 0.3141 * 0.2909 * 0.3073 *
SD91 0.0464 ** 0.0497 * 0.0425 ** 0.0499 * 0.0427 **
Loan loss provisions / loans 0.0183 0.0230 *** 0.0123 0.0241 *** 0.0128
SD91*(non-performing loans/loans) 0.1103 * 0.1278 * 0.0939 ** 0.1312 * 0.0957 **
Size 0.0857 * 0.0996 * 0.0918 * 0.0949 *** 0.0864 **
Implicit Interest Payments 0.0180 ** 0.0162 *** 0.0191 ** 0.0158 *** 0.0188 **
Liquid reserves / total assets 0.0019 0.0092 0.0178 0.0237 0.0279
Efficiency -0.0700 ** -0.0629 *** -0.0744 ** -0.0617 *** -0.0734 **
Non-interest income -0.0626 *** -0.0627 ***
Fee -0.0665 *** -0.0650 ***
Trade -0.0023 -0.0023
Loans / total assets 0.0647 0.0499
Deposits / total assets -0.0736 -0.0493
Dependent variable: net interest income / total assets
Estimations with fixed effects 
The reported t-statistics are based on robust standard errors
t-statistics are in parentheses
* Significant at 1%,** significant at 5%, and *** significant at 10%  
Source: Own elaboration based on data from Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores and Banco de México.
( 1 ) ( 2 )
Elasticities
( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 )
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Table 3. Determinants of the net interest margin 
(Dynamic model) 
Variable
Dependent variable (t-1) ** ** * ** *
Lerner * * * * *
Operating Cost / total assets * * ** * *
Equity / total assets ***     
SD91 *** * *** * *
Loan loss provisions / loans *** ** *** *  
SD91*(non-performing loans/loans)  ** *** *** **
ln(loans)   ** * *
Implicit Interest Payments ** *** ** * **
Liquid reserves / total assets  **    
Efficiency ** *** ** * **
Non-interest income ** ***
Fee   
Trade ***  
Loans / total assets ** *
Deposits / total assets  
Constant   ** * *
N. obs.
Arellano-Bond_order 1 [p-value]
Arellano-Bond_order 2 [p-value]
Sargan tests [p-value]
Difference-in-Sargan tests [p-value]
Lerner 0.43 * 0.54 * 0.53 * 0.65 * 0.48 * 0.63 * 0.51 * 0.63 * 0.46 * 0.56 *
Operating Cost / total assets 0.47 * 0.58 * 0.58 * 0.72 * 0.52 ** 0.67 ** 0.58 * 0.71 * 0.56 * 0.68 *
Equity / total assets 0.27 *** 0.34 *** 0.17  0.21  0.18  0.24 0.23  0.29 0.28  0.34
SD91 0.08 *** 0.10 *** 0.10 * 0.12 * 0.05 *** 0.07 *** 0.10 * 0.12 * 0.10 * 0.13 *
Loan loss provisions / loans 0.03 0.04 0.06 *** 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.06 ** 0.07 ** 0.03  0.03
SD91*(non-performing loans/loans) 0.19 ** 0.24 ** 0.29 * 0.36 * 0.22 *** 0.28 *** 0.28 * 0.35 * 0.21 ** 0.26 **
Size 0.09  0.12 0.08  0.10 0.14 ** 0.19 ** 0.16 * 0.20 * 0.20 * 0.25 *
Implicit Interest Payments 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.02 *** 0.03 *** 0.02 ** 0.02 ** 0.02 * 0.02 * 0.02 ** 0.03 **
Liquid reserves / total assets 0.08  0.09 0.12 ** 0.15 0.07  0.09 0.02  0.02 -0.10  -0.12
Efficiency -0.20 ** -0.25 ** -0.16 *** -0.19 *** -0.13 ** -0.17 ** -0.12 * -0.15 * -0.17 ** -0.21 **
Non-interest income -0.14 ** -0.17 ** -0.13 *** -0.16 ***
Fee -0.06  -0.08 -0.10  -0.12
Trade -0.003  -0.004 -0.002  -0.003
Loans / total assets -0.30 ** -0.37 ** -0.50 * -0.60 *
Deposits / total assets 0.11  0.14 0.39  0.47
Dependent variable: net interest income
The reported t-statistics are based on robust standard errors
t-statistics are in parentheses
* Significant at 1%,** significant at 5%, and *** significant at 10%  
System GMM results are two-step estimates. The two-step standard errors are computed in accordance to the Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction.
Source: Own elaboration based on data from Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores  and Banco de México .
( 1.12)
(-1.16) (-2.05) (-1.95) (-1.79)
-0.0112
( 1.73)
( 5 )
( 2.39)
Elasticities
( 2.16) ( 2.73)
( 3.24)( 4.60)( 4.59)
( 1 )
( 2.85)
( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 )
Short-term
( 2.55) ( 3.52)
Short-term Long-termLong-term
(-1.50)
Long-term
( 2.22) ( 2.49) ( 3.81)
Short-term Long-term Short-term Long-term Short-term
( 1.05)
( 1.12)
(-2.43)
(-0.89)
(-2.02) (-1.84) (-2.40) (-2.69) (-2.43)
( 3.98)
-0.0110
(-2.61)
(-1.98) (-1.94)
( 1.12) ( 1.49) ( 1.56)
( 1.70) ( 2.84)
( 1.71)
( 3.07) ( 2.71)
[0.009] [0.006]
[0.494] [0.785] [0.514] [0.779]
[0.390]
[0.460]
[0.020] [0.006][0.048]
[0.395]
[0.423] [0.515] [0.570]
[0.519] [0.805] [0.874] [0.824]
0.19480.1923
(-1.68)
( 3.02) ( 2.54)
( 2.85)
-0.0085
( 1.14)
( 1.55)
(-1.59) (-1.46) (-2.58) (-3.24) (-3.49)
-0.0816
( 0.58)
(-1.26)
0.2304 0.1924 0.1786
0.1122
0.54790.5711
( 5.22) ( 3.87)
-0.2493
-0.0382
0.0307
0.1023
0.0015
0.1400
-0.0286
0.0077
0.0096
-0.0148
0.1373
-0.0120
-0.6260
( 1.97) ( 1.82) ( 2.30) ( 2.63) ( 2.32)
( 1.15)
0.1052
0.4604
0.0997
0.0011
0.0045
0.0091
0.0227
-0.0141
( 2.17)
-0.3753
-0.0521 -0.0511
-0.3796
-0.3007
0.5155
0.0068
0.0057
0.0219
-0.0091
(-0.86)
( 1.84)
0.0374
0.0072
-0.3385
-0.0083
0.0050
0.0054
( 1.15) ( 0.18)
0.0037
-0.0133
0.0008
0.2075
-0.0099
( 1.68)
Difference-in-Sargan tests the additional instruments used by the System GMM estimator. Under the null hypothesis, valid specification, p-values are reported in square brackets.
0.0013
0.1249
0.2167
0.0076
0.08430.06660.0626
0.0014
0.2352
Arellano-Bond_order 1 (2) are tests for first (second)-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1). These test the first-differenced residuals in the system GMM estimators.
The Hansen test is a test of overidentification restrictions. Under the null hypothesis, the test statistic is distributed as a chi-squared in the number of overidentifyng restrictions, p-
values are presented in square brackets
-0.0728 -0.0712
235 235 235 235 235
[0.853]
0.0089
-0.0230
(-2.20)
0.1297 0.1191
0.5791
( 3.19)
( 4.16)
 
